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FRISCO JOE'S, INC., a Utah 
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT PEAY 
Case No, 
14,515 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for forcible entry and unlawful 
conversion by the lessee against the lessor of a commercial 
lot and building. The lessor also counterclaimed for de-
linquent rent payments owing under the lease agreement. 
The lessee also alleged that Defendants Hall and Hostetter, 
who had entered the business premises following the removal 
of the original lessee therefrom, had also converted the 
said lessee's equipment and furnishings left in the building. 
Defendants Hall and Hostetter counter-claimed for damages 
for interference with their use of said personal property; 
said defendants further cross-claimed for indemnification 
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for damages, for damages for the deprivation of the full 
use of said personal property, and to quiet title to the 
said personal property. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court on December 22, 
1975f the Honorable J. Robert Bullock/ presiding* The Court 
dismissed all claims with prejudice, except that it entered 
judgment for $1/250.00 for the defendant Peay against the 
plaintiff Tolman for unpaid rent and made no decision con-
cerning the ownership of the personal property in question. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Peay seeks affirmance of the judgment 
of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Respondent Peay controverts the facts as set 
forth in the appellant's brief/ as follows: 
1. The lease agreement between the appellant and 
Respondent Peay provided for a term of five years commencing 
January 1/ 1975 until December 31/ 1979/ with the aggregate 
rental totaling $26/400.00/ payable in monthly installments 
of $400.00 for 1975 and $450.00 thereafter. All payments 
were payable in advance and due on the first day of the month/ 
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with the exception of the payment for the last month's rent 
which was due on March 15/ 19 75. Said lease agreement also 
provided that any unpaid rent or charges were to constitute 
a first lien against any personal property on the premises 
and such property was not to be removed until all rent and 
charges were paid. (Plaintifffs Exhibit 11/ paragraphs 1/ 
2 and 15) 
2. The trade fixtures and equipment purchased 
by the appellant from Jay Hamilton were subject to a pro-
missory note and security agreement with Restaurant Stores 
and Equipment/ which note and security agreement had been 
assigned to Walker Bank. As of March 15/ 1975 the payments 
were substantially in arrears and foreclosure was imminent. 
(R 37/ 174) 
3. Despite repeated demands by Peay that the rent 
be paid/ the appellant was delinquent for the February and 
March rental payments thus compelling Peay to demand that 
all rent be paid by March 5/ 19 75. CR 103) On March 5f 
1975 the appellant came to the respondent's home and indicated 
that he was bankrupt; that he could not pay rent for February 
or March nor the $450.00 payment due on March 15/ 1975; that 
he was working at J. C. Penneys; that his sister who had 
been managing and operating the business during the daytime 
had quit; and that he would have to give the building up. 
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Respondent Peay then requested that Tolman surrender the 
keys to the building so Peay could enter and place a "For 
Rent sign" on the premises and Tolman agreed but wanted to 
keep the keys for a few days so he could remove some personal 
property. Several days passed without the keys being de-
livered whereupon Peay attempted to contact Tolman but was 
unsuccessful in doing so. The keys were in fact never de-
livered. (R 169, 181, 182) 
4. On March 11, 1975 Respondent Peay received 
a telephone call informing him that the door to the premises 
was unlocked and open and -upon inspection such was found 
to be true. He also noticed that some items of personal 
property were missing from the building and therefore assumed 
that Tolman had removed everything that he desired. (R 171, 
188). Since he had been unable to contact Tolman, Peay then 
had the locks changed the following morning in order to secure 
the premises and the contents. (R 170). On March 12, 1975, 
the day the locks were changed, Tolman discovered the same, 
but made no demand upon Peay then or at anytime thereafter 
that the premises or its contents be restored to him. (R 
106, 107, 117). 
5. Subsequent to March 12, 1975 Peay learned of 
the note and security agreement to Restaurant Stores and 
Equipment and that unless payments thereupon were immediately 
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forthcoming the equipment and trade fixtures would be re-
possessed. (R 174). On or before April 1, 1975 negotiations 
were commenced concerning the leasing of the building to 
Respondents Hall and Hostetter. Since Tolman had apparently 
abandoned the equipment and trade fixtures and was obviously 
in no position to bring the payments current it was decided 
that someone would have to purchase the equipment from Res-
taurant Stores. It was initially decided that Peay would 
purchase the equipment from Restaurant Stores and would then 
be reimbursed therefor by Hall and Hostetter. (R 175, 188/ 
189). A lease agreement was then drawn up wherein reimburse-
ment was provided for. (Plaintiff Exhibit 12). However 
after further consideration Peay decided that he did not 
want to get involved with the purchase of the equipment and 
the lease agreement was never executed, although Hall and 
Hostetter did enter into possession of the premises shortly 
thereafter. (R 175). Hall and Hostetter thereafter made 
arrangements with Walker Bank and Restaurant Stores to assume 
the promissory note and security agreement on the equipment. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 18). 
6. On April 14, 1975 Respondent Peay first learned 
that Tolman still claimed an interest in the equipment and 
trade fixtures when he was served with a ten-day summons. 
At Peay's instance a letter dated April 25, 1975 was sent 
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to Appellant Tolman offering to return any of the appellant's 
personal property upon the submission of a list of said 
property still on the premises* CDefendant's Exhibit 19). 
No list was ever submitted. (R 190). 
7. No communications were made by Tolman to Peay 
after March 5, 1975 until April 14, 1975 when Respondent 
Peay received the summons relating to this action. (R 117). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT RESPONDENT 
PEAY WAS NOT LIABLE FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY UNDER SECTION 78-36-1 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. 
Forcible entry and detainer statutes have been 
enacted in nearly every state for the purpose of preventing 
the breaches of the peace which had frequently occured under 
the common law when a landlord exercised his right to force-
fully dispossess a tenant who was delinquent in his rent 
payments. Section 7 8-36-1, Utah Code Annotated was enacted 
for the same general purpose: "The Forcible Entry and Detainer 
Statute was enacted for the primary purpose of preventing 
disturbances of the peace brought about through self-help 
in the matter of dispossession. King v Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419, 
285 P 2d 1114 (1955). Hence when a delinquent tenant refuses 
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to surrender the premises upon demand, the landlord must 
institute an action for wrongful detainer in lieu of his 
common law remedy of self-help. However, because the gravamen 
of an action for forcible entry is an unlawful interference 
with the possession of a tenant the statute is inapplicable 
in those situations where the tenant is not in actual posses-
sion , whether by abandonment or surrender. Consequently 
to maintain an action for forcible entry a plaintiff must 
establish that he was in actual and peaceable possession 
of the premises and that the defendant forcibly entered and 
dispossessed the plaintiff by force. Section 78-36-9, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. 
The appellant fails to take cognizance of the 
requirement that the tenant be in actual possessionf inasmuch 
as in all the cases relied upon in the appellant1s brief, 
no question was raised regarding the tenant's possession, 
rather the controversy there centered around whether the 
lessor's actions constituted a forcible entry or whether 
such actions were excused by a provision in the contract 
granting the right to enter. In particular, the Peterson 
case, which the appellant maintains is "almost exactly 
identical" to this case, is distinguishable on its facts. 
There, unlike this case, "no demand was made at that time 
that the rental be brought up to date, and no indication 
Page 8 
was made of an intention to terminate the lease." Peterson v 
Piatt, 16 Utah 2d 330, 331; 400 P 2d 507 (1965) Moreover the 
appellant's citation from the Mariani case merely indicates 
what the burden of proof is at the trial level, as to whether 
a surrender by operation of law will be found. As pointed 
out below, upon appeal the appellate court has a duty to uphold 
the findings of fact by the trial court if such are supported 
by substantial evidence. 
In this case the trial court found that the appellant 
surrendered his possession of the premises to the respondent 
on or about March 12, 197 5. "The question of whether the acts 
and circumstances constituted a surrender and acceptance is 
one for the fact finder." Mariani Air Products v Gill's Tire 
Market, 29 Utah 2d 291, 292, 508 P 2d 808 (1973) Hence in 
the absence of an express agreement surrendering the premises 
the trial court must ascertain the intent of the parties as 
manifested by their acts in order to determine whether there 
has been a surrender by operation of law. Belanger v Rice, 
2 Utah 2d 250, 252; 272 P 2d 173 (1954) 
At the trial substantial evidence was introduced 
indicating that the appellant intended to and did surrender 
the leased premises to the respondent. Respondent Peay 
testified that on March 5, 1975 the appellant met with him 
as his home and said, 
. . . that he had gone as far as he could go, that 
he was going to have to take out bankruptcy, that 
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he hadnft been able to make his February payment 
and that he could not make his March paymentf nor 
he couldn't make the last month's payment that 
he agreed to make on the 15th day of March? making 
a total of $1,250.00; and that he would have to 
give up the building because he had already gone 
to work for J. C. Penneys, and his sister didn't 
want to continue in the business any longer, and 
so he would have to give it up and give it back 
to me. 
(R 169) On cross examination Respon'dant Peay reaffirmed 
that appellant Tolman had manifested his bankruptcy and intent 
to surrender the building. (R 181, 182) 
Respondent Peay further testified and the appellant 
admitted that Tolman had agreed to return the keys to the 
respondent after he had had a couple of days to remove some 
personal property from the premises. (R 169 and 115). 
The appellant's intent to surrender the premises 
on March 5, 1975 becomes clear when viewed in the context 
of the surrounding circumstances. The appellant testified 
that he had barely covered his expenses the first month of 
operation and for the second he had failed to make enough 
even to cover the rent. Moreover he testified that he had 
worked 12 hours a day six days a week for which he drew no 
salary whatsoever. (R 116) Evidence was also introduced 
that the appellant had placed a "Closed For Remodeling" sign 
on the building on or before March 5, 1975, but no remodeling 
was ever carried out and the real reason for closing the 
business was lack of sufficient funds to keep the business 
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open. (R 116} Furthermore it was testified that prior to 
March 5, 1975 the appellant had begun removing some of the 
equipment and personal property from the business premises. 
(R 117-119) The appellant also testified that subsequent 
to March 5, 1975 he never contacted the respondent nor at 
anytime demanded that the premises be returned. (R 117) 
If the appellant1s intent was not to surrender the premises 
it would seem that the appellant would have at least main-
tained some contact with the respondant subsequent to March 
5, 1975 and he would certainly have protested the changing 
of the locks on March 12, 1975. 
The evidence also clearly indicates that the respondent 
accepted the appellant's surrender of the premises on or 
before March 12, 1975. The Respondent Peay testified that 
upon hearing of Mr. Tolmanfs intention to give up the building, 
he had remarked, "Well, if thats the case, we had better 
put a for rent sign on it and get it rented . . ." — thus 
indicating his understanding that unless a surrender was 
effected the appellant would still be on the lease. (R 169) 
Mr. Peay further reaffirmed his acceptance of the surrender 
upon cross examination where he denied any intention on his 
part, to assist the appellant in leasing the building to 
someone else. (R 182) 
As indicated above there is substantial evidence 
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from which the trial court was justified in drawing the 
conclusion that a surrender had been made. By virtue of 
the greater proximity of the trial judge to the parties 
involved and the surrounding circumstances, great deference 
is traditionally accorded findings of fact on appeal. The 
Utah Supreme Court recognized this in Charlton v Hackett, 
11 Utah 2d 389, 390; 360 P 2d 176 (1961) where it stated, 
In considering the attack on the findings and 
judgment of the trial court it is our duty to follow 
these cardinal rules of review: to indulge them 
a presumption of validity and correctness; to 
require the appellant to sustain the burden of 
showing error; to review the record in the light 
most favorable to them; and not to disturb them 
if they find substantial support in the evidence. 
Since there was substantial evidence of a surrender of the 
possession of the premises the trial court's finding that 
there was no forcible entry should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT RESPONDENT 
PEAY DID NOT UNLAWFULLY CONVERT THE PERSONAL PROPERTY OF 
THE APPELLANT. 
In Allred v Hinckley, 8 Utah 2d 73, 76; 328 P 2d 
726 (1958) this court defined the act of conversion: "A 
conversion is an act of wilful interference with a chattel, 
done without lawful justification by which the person entitled 
thereto is deprived of its use and possession." Hence 
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in order to maintain an action for conversion a plaintiff 
must prove 1) that he had an immediate right to possession 
of the chattel and 2) that the defendant unlawfully deprived 
him of the possession thereof. It is the immediate right 
to possession, not the ownership of the chattel, which is 
of concern. Johnson v Flowers, 119 Utah 425, 428; 228 P 
2d 408 (1951) Where the property is subject to a lien in 
favor of a defendant and is withheld because of the lien, 
it is necessary to tender the amount due the lienholder before 
bringing an action for conversion. 18 Am Jur 2d. In this 
case the appellant expressly covenanted that any unpaid rent 
or charges were to constitute a first lien on the fixtures, 
furnishings, machinery, equipment and other items of personal 
property and that such personal property was not to be removed 
from the premises until the said rent and charges were fully 
paid. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, paragraph No. 15). The appellant 
admitted that he was in arrears for two month's rent and 
could not pay the last month's rent as agreed to in the 
contract, and also that he never at any time after March 
5, 1975 tendered the rent that was in arrears. Hence under 
the terms of the lease agreement the respondent was entitled 
to a first lien right which was superior to any right to 
possession claimed by the appellant and therefore due to 
the lack of the right to immediate possession, an action 
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for conversion cannot be maintained. 
In addition to failing to establish an immediate 
right to possession, the appellant also did not establish 
that there was an unlawful assumption of ownership or control 
by the respondent over the chattels involved* Where the 
original taking was lawful, where the defendant is rightfully 
in possession, or where there has been no wrongful assumption 
of ownership it has been held that a demand upon the defendant 
is necessary in order to establish an unlawful assertion 
of ownership and control. 18 Am Jur 2d 19 7. The Utah Supreme 
Court imposed an even more stringent standard in Christensen 
v Pugh, 84 Utah 440, 26 P 2d 100, 104 (1934) where it observed, 
It is undoubtedly true that there are cases 
where a demand is unnecessary, but we know 
of no case, and we can think of no situation, 
where a demand for possession is not a 
requisite to an action for conversion, except 
where facts are pleaded which show it impossible 
for the bailee to deliver or such a demand 
would be useless. 
As pointed out above the appellant had surrendered the 
premises to the respondent and therefore any initial as-
sumption of control over the chattels was certainly within 
the bounds of the law. Moreover since the respondent held 
a first lien right he was entitled to possession of the 
personal property within the building, until the rental 
payments were brought current. Hence because the intial 
taking was lawful a demand for the return of the property 
Page 14 
must have been made in order to maintain an action for 
conversion* Since it was admitted that no demand was 
ever made (R 117) there was not the requisite wrongful 
assumption of ownership of control at the time when the 
respondent secured the premises or at any time thereafter. 
The appellant contends that Respondent Peay 
appropriated the equipment and furnishings for his own use 
when he leased the building to Respondents Hall and Hostetter. 
However the evidence shows that Peay never at any time 
claimed to own the equipment, although because of Hallfs 
and Hostetter's financial condition, Peay agreed to pay off 
Restaurant Stores and Equipment to prevent repossession and 
then have Hall and Hostetter reimburse Peay over a period 
of time. A lease agreement providing for the reimbursement 
was prepared, but after further consideration Peay decided 
that he did not want to get involved and consequently the 
lease agreement was never executed. Hall and Hostetter then 
independently negotiated with Restaurant Stores and Equipment 
for the assumption of the note and security agreement. (R 
175, 176, 189) Furthermore the evidence also shows that once 
the Respondent Peay learned that Tolman still claimed an 
interest in the equipment and trade furnishings he was at all 
times willing to deliver any personal property still on the 
premises to Tolman upon the submission of a list of the items 
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of personal property still claimed by the appellant. (De-
fendant's Exhibit 19) Such list was never submitted by 
Mr. Tolman. 
In summary the respondent contends that since the 
appellant surrendered the premises and also had no immediate 
right to the possession of the equipment and trade fixtures 
within the building by virtue of the respondent's first-lien 
rights, there was no conversion of the property when the 
respondent secured the premises by changing the locks. 
Moreover there was no subsequent conversion of the appellant's 
alleged personal property because the appellant abandoned 
such personal property by making no demand for the return 
thereof and by allowing the payments on the note to become 
delinquent to the point that foreclosure was imminent. Further-
more, once the respondent learned that the appellant still 
claimed any interest in the equipment he was at all times 
thereafter willing to deliver to the appellant any property 
owned by him. The trial court was therefore correct in 
dismissing the action for wrongful conversion. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED THE RESPONDENT 
$1,250.00 FOR DELINQUENT RENT AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE LEASE 
AGREEMENT 
According to the lease agreement between the appellant 
and respondent, the term of the lease was for a period of 
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five (5) years commencing January 1, 1975 to December 31, 
1979. The aggregate rental for such period was $26,400.00, 
payable in one month installments, each payment for the 
following month being due on the first day of the month. 
The payments were to be $400.00 per month for the first year 
and $450.00 per month for each month thereafter. In addition 
the lessee agreed to pay the "last months rent" amounting 
to $450.00 and payable on or before March 15, 1975. Moreover 
the appellant also agreed that in the event of a lawful 
re-entry or surrender, he would be liable for the difference 
between the rent reserved for the portion of the term remaining 
after re-entry or surrender and the amount received from 
a party reletting for such portion of the term. 
In the trial the appellant admitted being in arrears 
for the months of February and March. (R 117) There is 
no contention that the rent for February was not correctly 
awarded? however the appellant does contend that an award 
for rent accruing in March should be made only on a pro rata 
basis. Such a position however is untenable. f|If the rent 
for the entire period between rent days is payable in advance 
a surrender during the period does not operate to discharge 
the rent or any portion thereof for such period. The theory 
of this view is that rent payable in advance is considered 
as accruing on the date on which it is due." Hindin v Caine, 
104 CA 2d 238, 231 P 2d 83 (1951); 18 ALR 967; 49 Am Jur 
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2d 1067. Since the March rental payment was due on March 
1, the appellant was correctly held liable for the full amount 
of the March rental payment. 
The appellant also contends that the award for 
the "last month's rent" was duplicative or in any event had 
not accrued until March 15, 19 75. That the award was not 
duplicative is clearly established by the lease agreement 
which provided that the term of the lease was to commence 
on January 1, 1975 and continue until December 31, 1979, 
and that the lessee was to make an advance payment of $450.00 
"which shall constitute the last month's rent under the terms 
of the lease." Clearly the month in contemplation was December 
of 1979, and not the last month of occupation in the event 
that the lease was prematurely terminated. 
Regarding the appellant's contention that the "last 
months rent" had not accrued at the time of the surrender 
it is important to keep in mind that the lease agreement 
provided for a tenancy for years. As such a lessee becomes 
liable, to the extent not mitigated by rental payments made 
by another lessee subsequently entering the premises, for 
the entire sum of rental payments agreed to, (in this case 
$26,400.00) notwithstanding the fact that the payments may 
be made in monthly installments. In fact in this case the 
appellant explicitly agreed that in the event of re-entry 
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or surrender, he would be liable for such difference. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 11, Clause 14) Hence in any event the appellant 
is liable for rent for the period of time when the premises 
are vacant, which in this case was March 12 to April 1. 
Normally payment for such "last month's rent" is demanded 
at the date of execution of the lease agreement, but in this 
case due to the appellant's inadequate financial resources 
he was granted an additional period of time to make the payment. 
Since the last month's payment had accrued prior to the surrender, 
the trial court was correct in making an award of $1,250.00. 
CONCLUSION 
There was substantial evidence from which the trial 
court could find that the appellant surrendered the premises 
in question to the respondent. Since the appellant had sur-
rendered the premises he did not have the requisite possession 
necessary for the maintenance of an action for forcible entry. 
Further, since the appellant had surrendered the 
premises and since the respondent held a first lien on the 
appellant's personal property, the appellant was not entitled 
to immediate possession of his alleged personal property 
within the leased building. Moreover since the initial 
assumption of control was lawful, and no demand was ever 
made thereafter and the respondent was always willing to 
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relinquish any personal property owned by the appellant, 
there was no subsequent conversion of the appellant's personal 
property. In view of the foregoing the trial court was 
correct in holding that there was no wrongful conversion 
by Respondent Peay of the appellant's personal property. 
Furthermore all rights to rent payments accrued 
at the signing of the lease and since the appellant defaulted 
in the payment thereof, he was correctly held liable in the 
amount of $1,250.00. 
The respondent therefore respectfully requests 
that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed. 
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